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IKE can optionally provide a Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which is a property of key exchanges, that, in turn, means for IKE that compromising the long term phase 1 key will not allow to easily gain access to all IPsec data that is protected by SAs established through this phase 1. General recommendation is to avoid using PSK authentication method.
Cisco shrew soft vpn no proposal chosen Offline#
Warning: PSK authentication was known to be vulnerable against Offline attacks in "aggressive" mode, however recent discoveries indicate that offline attack is possible also in case of "main" and "ike2" exchange modes. This phase should match following settings: All SAs established by IKE daemon will have lifetime values (either limiting time, after which SA will become invalid, or amount of data that can be encrypted by this SA, or both).
Cisco shrew soft vpn no proposal chosen android#
17.2.6 Android (strongSwan) client configuration.17.2.2.1 Enabling dynamic source NAT rule generation.17.2.1.3 Generating client certificates.17.2 Road Warrior setup using IKEv2 with RSA authentication.16.4.2 Using same routing table with multiple IP addresses.16.4 Manually specifying local-address parameter under Peer configuration.16.3 Allow only IPsec encapsulated traffic.16.2 Simple mutual PSK XAuth configuration.